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The problem 
In this chapter we analyze the working of a Transitional Incident Prevention Program (TIPP)  designed to 
improve the safety of patients during their transition between primary and hospital care. We 
systematically describe what the TIPP entails and how its elements link to the outcomes of the program 
achieved so far (Mayne 2010, Dixon-Woods 2011).  
Recent years have seen the development and implementation of tools aimed at improving the patient’s 
transition in referral or discharge between home and hospital. These tools include case managers, 
transition coaches, medication reconciliation, follow up phone calls, accessible digital medical records for 
patients, communication protocols such as ISBAR, discharge guidelines and referral guidelines (Naylor 
2000, Coleman 2006 , Jack 2009, Snow 2009 , Scotten 2015, Buurman 2016). However, the fidelity of 
interventions and their outcomes (e.g., 30-day readmission rates) is often variable and sub-optimal 
(Hansen 2011, Jayakody 2016, Kansagara 2016, Brewster 2016 ).  Given limited resources available to 
develop and sustain safe systems – such as shared electronic records – the information exchange between 
general practitioners and hospital specialists and staff is often inadequate (Berendsen 2009, Gobel 2012, 
Jones 2015) . Consequently, the follow-up to a referral or discharge remains uncertain. For example, GPs 
do not know if their referral instructions are being heeded, while hospital specialists continue monitoring 
patients after discharge as they are not sure that GPs are following their own instructions.  
Despite all the patient-safety initiatives, the safety of patient transitions depends – and will continue to 
depend – at least in part upon personal contact between GPs, hospital specialists and their respective 
staffs (Wijngaarden 2006).(Wijngaarden 2006) It depends, for example, on whether a hospital physician 
will call the GP if a referral letter is late or unclear. It is contingent on whether physicians know each 
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other well enough to give feedback on a flawed transition. In short, direct communication depends upon 
informal relationships (Cott 1997, Anthony 2003).  
Our approach 
Several relevant concepts touch on measures to develop informal relationships and improve direct 
communication, such as the generative safety culture, learning organization and reflexive professionals 
(see Table 1). Safety culture refers not only to the awareness for safety, but also to hierarchical flexibility, 
such as respect for the GP who points out mistakes made in a patient’s transition, or whether adverse 
incidents can be disclosed without sanctions (Zwart 2011). Organizational learning is different as it 
focuses upon change (Wijngaarden 2006). Learning, defined as improving performance, is a change 
mechanism which professionals can use to give direction to change and ensure compliance to rules. 
Learning requires proximity, be it physical, task, professional or social proximity. In other words, 
learning becomes easier when place, status, language and mental images are similar.  
We prefer the concept of reflexivity, defined as the capacity of a team to monitor and change events, 
behavior and contexts (Lynch 2000, Iedema 2011). Individuals who work together discuss how they 
work, share their perceptions of what they see and exchange the solutions they believe in (Carroll, Iedema 
et al. 2008, Mesman 2011). Note: reflexivity is open-ended. Its focus is diffuse: any practice and any 
variation to the rules can be explored. Thus, it does not focus particularly on the elements of safety 
systems or indeed on change. It focuses on everyday performance and adjustments in that performance 
that create acceptable outcomes for the system (Hollnagel 2006). 
Table 1. Concepts that shaped measures designed to improve personal relationships and enhance safety 
Concept Safety Culture Organizational 
Learning 
Reflexivity 
Focus Awareness change Everyday performance 
Mechanism A focus upon safety 
drives performance 
Professionals give 
direction to change 
Variation drives better 
performance 
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The transitional safety program 
In 2012 we designed a transitional safety program based on reflexivity (Melle, Zwart et al. 2015) which 
we implemented from 2013 onwards. The aim of the program was to understand how physicians move 
competently within primary care centers and hospitals providing safe care. Physicians should – after 
completing the program – demonstrate an awareness of and responsiveness to the system of patient 
transition. The key question was whether informal relations that enhance direct communication – and are 
perquisites for reflexivity – can be created in a short period of time and can be used to focus on the safety 
of patient transitions. The program will generate tools for primary care centers and hospitals to improve 
transitional safety. 
We involved three hospitals and their referring primary care centers (see Table 2) in our Transitional 
Incident Prevention Program. We selected two disciplines in the hospitals, gastroenterology and 
cardiology since both frequently have patients transitioning to and from primary care clinics. Moreover, 
direct referrals from primary care centers to these departments in teaching hospitals are common. Lastly, 
these disciplines offer both acute care and chronic care delivery along with primary care. 
Table 2. TIPP participants 
Hospitals Primary care centers 
A general hospital in a small town in the north of the 
Netherlands (197 beds) delivering secondary care 
18 referring primary care centers in 
the rural region 
General teaching hospital (381 beds) delivering secondary care 
in one of the four main cities in the Netherlands  
 
44 referring primary care centers in 
the city and surrounding suburbs 
An academic teaching hospital (1042 beds) delivering secondary 
and tertiary care in one of the four main cities in the Netherlands 
(same as above) 
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In this section we describe the program, linking its elements to the outcomes we have achieved to date 
(see Table 3). To do this linking, we reflected with the project team on how the original study protocol 
developed over time (Melle, Zwart et al. 2015). The project team consisted of three GPs, two 
epidemiologists and one social scientist. In addition to our team reflection, we interviewed hospital 
specialists and GPs about their experiences with the program, both individually and in focus groups. 
Table 3. TIPP elements 
Baseline measures  
(used in reflexivity 
discussion) 
Facilitators of reflexivity Proposed interventions 
Review of the scientific 
literature 
 
Identifying transitional 
incidents via existing 
reporting systems,  
 
Regional patient survey 
 
Regional health care 
provider survey 
Joint discussion meeting on 
evidence of regional transitional 
safety 
 
Multidisciplinary project group 
meetings 
 
Start transitional incident reporting 
and mutual root cause analysis of 
transitional incidents  
 
Practice exchange visits 
Group consultations for patients handed 
over from cardiologist to general 
practitioner for follow up 
 
Safe email communication/ 
improvement of referral and discharge 
letters via Zorgdomein1  
 
Development and implementation of 
patient info card, medication passports  
 
Evidence-based reflexivity for transitional safety 
In our TIPP, we assessed transitional risks with the aim of developing and implementing safety 
management measures. First we reviewed the scientific literature and made summaries of the known risks 
of patients’ transitions to present to the physicians. As evidence is collected in international health care 
systems differently than in the Dutch system, we collected additional local data with two surveys: one for 
professionals and one for patients. The survey for professionals included questions concerning transitional 
safety, collaboration, communication, and incident reporting. The survey addressed relational -, 
                                                 
1
 Zorgdomein – translates as Care Domain -is an ICT application  for general practitioners to refer patients to 
hospital specialists. 
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informational – and managerial continuity (Haggerty 2003). The survey for patients included questions on 
the relation with their physicians in both primary and secondary care, the exchange of information, and 
collaboration between the GP and specialists in the hospital. 
We presented the results of the general and local risk assessments to the physicians and asked them to 
reflect on this evidence and share their experiences related to transitional safety. Together we reflected on 
how differently hospital physicians and GPs explain incidents. Hospital staff were mostly concerned with 
procedures that were either missing or not used. The GPs expressed their personal commitment to their 
patients and their frustration at not being able to oversee what was happening to ‘their’ patient.  
“The referrals are just not clear and I don’t have a clue whether GPs actually see 
how the referral system is setup. For example, patients with shoulder pain… The GP’s 
main concern is to get these patient seen in hospital, and they don’t really care who 
gets to see them … So, this patient will see an orthopedist or even a rheumatologist, 
who will treat them for their painful shoulder for a year or two. This, despite the fact 
that there is an excellent guideline for chronic shoulder pain that states there is 
practically never an indication for surgery. These patients get operated on and only 
then do they come and see us. That’s such a pity, since they’ve lost a lot of time and 
missed out on lots of other options.” (Physician, hospital 1) 
Versus: 
“Well, one thing still makes me mad. We requested an X-ray for a child. She had 
Ewing’s sarcoma, which is a severe condition and my colleague asked for two X-rays. 
The radiology department decided to do just the one. They didn’t bother to tell the 
doctor about this, they just took one x-ray, not of the right part, and this led to a 
couple of weeks’ delay before the right diagnosis was made. (…)The complicated 
communication with the hospital is what I find the most irritating. First, we can't find 
out who took the decision and if they even consulted a radiologist. You just don't know 
how it went. I consulted with the pediatrician and he reported the incident and said he 
would discuss it with the radiologist and he would get back to me. I ended up calling 
twice but it still stayed unresolved. This was frustrating for the mother, but for us too.  
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I think it’s really an example of something you can’t get a grip on. I really regret I 
happening.” (General practitioner in the catchment area of hospital 2 and 3) 
 
Between 2012 and 2016, we asked the internal medicine and cardiology staffs and all members of the GP 
practices every fourth month to report on any transitional incidents for one week. The project team trained 
the staff to recognize transitional incidents by giving detailed examples (see Box 1), presenting local risk 
data and holding reflexive meetings on transitional safety. In addition, the project team initiated analyses 
of transitional incidents reported for both hospitals and GP practices by the stakeholders involved.  
Box 1. Examples of transitional incidents  
Palliative patient in severe pain requests to be discharged on Friday afternoon; the hospital does not 
pass on information or instructions from the responsible anesthetist to the GP. 
A patient with known heart failure visits the GP presenting minor decompensation. GP starts 
bumetanide, although the patient already has furosemide prescribed by the cardiologist. Four months 
later, the cardiologist discovers the double medication. The patient has lost a lot of weight and is 
already slightly dehydrated. 
Elderly patient does not want treatment or admission; she suffers from dyspnoe and is admitted to the 
hospital; she passes away in the hospital instead of at home (which she had wanted) 
A patient diagnosed with untreatable liver carcinoma visits the GP for mental support and additional 
information. The GP was not informed by the cardiologist about the diagnosis. 
A patient is diagnosed with abdominal aortic aneurysm. The GP is not informed about the diagnosis. 
The patient visits the GP for pain in his back. The GP does not recognize this pain as a symptom of a 
ruptured aneurysm in time. The patient dies. 
 
Because the participants were hesitant to report incidents, we added additional reflexivity meetings. The 
physicians felt dissatisfied and discouraged with the data they already had on the risks and recurrence of 
incidents in both the hospital and the GP’s practice. “What to do when up to 20 patients a week get 
harmed because their discharge letter is missing and no one cares?” (Physician, hospital 3). In the TIPP, 
the physicians met each other at project meetings, in a transitional safety workshop, and over dinner, etc. 
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We started each meeting with a presentation of new data on identified risks or incidents. Posing open 
questions on social, cultural and political issues, we opened up discussions on what it takes to get to know 
a patient, for example, and whether and how one can take personal responsibility for the transition of a 
single patient.  
At the end of the program, hospital physicians shadowed GPs for a day and in turn, the GPs shadowed the 
hospital physicians for a day. The idea was to see the other at work and to see what the other does when 
he or she hands over a patient. According to the care providers in the project team, the transitional safety 
program enlarged the group of care providers who are worried about the risks associated with the 
transition of patients between healthcare organizations. It made more managers and physicians aware that 
the topic of transitional safety needs closer attention.  
Hospital physician: “How can I say this? It’s all about how we talk with each other. 
Communication is key.” 
Researcher: “Did the transitional safety program affect communication? Did it 
improve things?” 
Hospital physician: “Hm, I doubt it. Not a lot.” 
Researcher: “Not a lot…” 
Hospital physician: “I think it created awareness. That was its impact. (…)” 
 
We discussed the meaning of awareness, why it is relevant and how to stimulate it.  
Researcher: “Is awareness enough? If so, what do you need to make it happen? Did 
we really have to do all that risk analysis, develop the trigger tool, organize and 
support incident reporting and arrange all these meetings? Or did we crack a nut with 
a sledgehammer?”  
[long pause]  
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Cardiologist: “You are the mouse who danced with an elephant. The hospital hardly 
noticed [what you did].”  
 
The physicians did not expect that a new hand-over procedure – for instance, a mutual communicating 
format built into their electronic health records – would be developed soon, nor did they believe that any 
procedure in itself would solve the problem. In fact, they expected new procedures to spawn new 
problems. Discussing the topic of waiting for improvements triggered another discussion about what they 
could do to improve the safety of transitions without introducing new procedures or technology. They 
began by defining which incidents are acceptable and which incidents are not. One example was the GP’s 
referral letter with omissions or errors in the medication list sent to the hospital. At the start of the 
program, medication list errors was one of the issues that discouraged the physicians from addressing 
transitional safety. Reflexivity changed their perception of this problem, as the following quote shows. 
Hospital physician: “I shadowed a GP for a day and he visited me while I took care of 
my clinic. He also joined an oncology team meeting and could see how we collaborate 
in the hospital. The GP observed how I get referral letters, how I see my patients and 
what information I get. When I visited him he had invited some complicated patients. I 
was most impressed by what he has to do for his referral letters. I believe it is easier 
to assemble a car than to write a referral letter. GPs work with the system 
Zorgdomein. Out of a very long list of possible items, they have to select the items they 
want to include in their letter. (...) Now I fully understand why the medication lists 
GPs send me are seldom complete. It helps to know how the letter is composed. I no 
longer require a complete medication list from a GP. Knowing the problem, I can 
work around it.” 
And: 
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GP in the catchment area of hospital 1: “I saw what happened to my carefully edited referral 
letter– properly laid out on my own computer – when it got to the computer of the 
gastroenterologist. It was stripped of any formatting that made it readable and that also made a 
complete mess of the current medication prescriptions. Seeing that, I could well understand why 
the GP’s reputation is not always so good in this hospital, sometimes even sloppy...” 
 
Better understanding the work flow and processes of the other enhanced a sense of community around 
transitional safety. Hospital physicians who know GPs, understand why GPs cannot provide a complete 
medication list. They see how the GP’s carefully composed referral letter changes on arrival at the 
hospital. They no longer blame the GP for the poor quality of the letter once it enters the hospital’s 
system. Moreover, they understand that asking for a complete list of medications would not solve the 
problem. Hence, they find other ways to complete the lists, such as asking patients and defining the exact 
risk of certain medications.  
Still, some care providers did develop new procedures for transitions. For example, the cardiologists in 
one of the general hospitals set up group consultations where the cardiologist and GP jointly explained to 
small groups of invited patients how the GP would be handling their aftercare now that their hospital 
treatment was finished. Another measure was a card for patients on safe transition (Box 2), designed to 
remind patients what steps could be risky during the transition from home to hospital or vice versa, and to 
help them formulate questions about these issues.  
Figure. Transitional safety tips for patients (chart will be sent seperately. Please add translation as 
footnote to the picture) 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Be aware: your health care team may not have all the relevant information. 
Tell your health care team about all the medicines you are taking. 
Bring a family member or a friend with you when you meet your health care team. 
Know who you can contact in case you have questions or problems occur. 
Talk about any concern or question you have. 
Know the what, when, and where of the care or treatment you are about to receive. 
 
Research reflections 
In this chapter we analyzed the working of a transitional safety program. Knowing that the transition of 
patients between primary care and hospital care is a complex system and that the resources for safety 
management are limited, our aim was to teach physicians how to move competently between primary care 
and hospital care. The TIPP focused on enhancing direct, personal communication between GPs and 
hospital physicians as a condition for improving transitional safety.  
Like most safety programs, the TIPP began with risk analysis. Between the initial risk analysis and 
subsequent development of safety management measures, we included rounds of reflexivity sessions. 
Reflexivity enabled the physicians to understand and recognize transitional safety risks and become 
resilient. It fostered a dialogue on structural safety management measures that would improve daily 
processes as well as the participants’ ability to be resilient to these risks in daily practice when no 
structural, adequate safety management measure is in place. In the program, physicians reflected upon 
everyday performance adjustments that prevent failures from happening and – just as important– create 
acceptable outcomes for patients. For example, an incomplete medication list or a missing referral letter 
became recognized as transitional safety problems, shared safety problems instead of just any old 
problem caused by poor performance and usually the fault of someone else on the other side. These 
problems became acceptable in the sense that physicians were willing and able to act upon the missing 
information for as long as the shared problems had not been solved together. 
The state-of-the art method for reflexivity is video reflexive ethnography. It involves observing people at 
work, interviewing and filming them in action. Footage is selected and presented to caregivers who are 
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asked to discuss and solve the communication problems. (Carroll, Iedema et al. 2008). In our TIPP we 
developed an alternative to video reflexive ethnography. Rather than footage, we took the risk analysis as 
the starting point for reflexivity. We did so because physicians strongly believe in evidence as a starting 
point for improving quality and safety. They prefer to start from evidence-based risk analyses which 
should underpin any plan for change that consequently should contain evidence-based interventions and 
fit into their own primary workflow.  
Our TIPP generated a community of general practitioners and hospital physicians whose common aim 
became to improve transitional safety. At several meetings the physicians discussed how they understood 
a problem, how they interpreted the incident in their local context and how they could develop pragmatic 
solutions that would fit their workflow and current abilities. This extended their network, a strong benefit 
as having a network is key to moving competently within primary care centers and hospitals. Moving 
competently involves: 1) knowing which failures are permissible and which are not, and 2) knowing what 
the other stakeholders can and cannot do. Here, we see a similarity with the work of Charles Bosk who 
explained that learning how to make mistakes – that is, knowing which errors you are allowed or not 
allowed to make – is a key lesson in medical education (Bosk 2003).  
One could say: patient safety should not depend upon informal relations; it requires a safe system 
(Vincent 2010), a reliable system that can perform consistently under specific conditions for a certain 
time. A safe system would ensure the probability of success that, for example, recommendations will be 
followed or referral letters will comply with standards. Yet, current health delivery practice is a highly 
complex system and not all of its processes are as ‘manufacturable’ as one would wish (Braithwaite 
2015). Hence, resilience is needed. Rounds of reflexivity support care providers’ resilience, and in the 
TIPP we learned that reflexivity can and does result in safety management measures. The TIPP boosted 
the implementation of a new guideline for communication between GPs and hospital specialists. It 
initiated the start of group discharge consultations and a regional initiative to create an integrated 
electronic healthcare record. Meanwhile, continuing reflexivity meetings – on, for example, transitional 
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incidents or more prospectively, subjects relevant to transitional safety such as clinical guidelines or 
current shared cases – will support clinicians to work around current, persistent system flaws that need 
long-term solutions.  
Conclusion 
Reflexivity meetings for clinicians from different health care settings help clinicians to move competently 
in the health care chain. Discussing evidence-based current performance on transitional safety, such as 
incident reports, patient-reported outcomes and the perceptions of health care providers fosters the 
building of a community that is focused on improving transitional safety management. Evidence 
reflexivity fits in well with medical practices and works in a similar way to other forms of reflexivity.  
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